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A Constitutional Chaos and A Call for Help: The
Chiaroscuro Backdrop' of Johnson v. Board of
Regents of the University of Georgia2
"Race is the perpetual American dilemma."
3
INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court uses strict scrutiny to review
a claim that a classification violates a plaintiffs rights under the
Equal Protection Clause4 of the Fourteenth Amendment if the
classification is suspect. Under strict scrutiny, the objective sought
by the government must be compelling and the means chosen by the
government must be narrowly tailored to achieve that compelling
objective. In other words, suspect classifications withstand
constitutional muster when they are necessary to fulfill a compelling
governmental objective.
It was not until 1944 in Korematsu v. United States5 that race
was specifically recognized as a suspect class so as to subject any
racial classifications to strict scrutiny. In an opinion by Justice
Black, the Court stated that "all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect...
[and] courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. '
Therefore, race is a suspect class and any classification based on
race must be necessary, or narrowly tailored, to further a compelling
governmental objective.
The history of race in the context of education took an important
step in 1954 in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.7 In Brown,
the Court expressed that the idea of "separate but equal" was
inherently unequal, and therefore, any law based on the "separate
but equal" doctrine violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Copyright 2003, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
1. The title of this article was taken from the opinion of Judge Selya of the
First Circuit Court of Appeals in Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790, 796 (1st Cir.
1998).
2. 263 F.3d 1234 (1lth Cir. 2001).
3. Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 128 (4th Cir.
1999) (citing J. Harvie Wilkinson III, From Brown to Bakke 8 (1979)).
4. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause states that "'No
State shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws."
5. 323 U.S. 214, 65 S.Ct. 193 (1944).
6. Id. at 216, 65 S.Ct. at 194. The Court also upheld the exclusion order
under strict scrutiny review.
7. 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686 (1954).
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Fourteenth Amendment.8 However, the Brown decision did not end
the use of racial classifications in education. Claims of racial
discrimination continue to plague courts, as the Eleventh Circuit
discovered in Johnson v. Board of Regents of the University of
Georgia.9
In August 1999, Plaintiffs Jennifer Johnson, Aimee Bogrow, and
Molly Ann Beckenhauer challenged the University of Georgia's
("UGA") freshman admissions policy alleging that it discriminated
against them based on race. Specifically, the Vlaintiffs claimed the
policy violated the Equal Protection Clause 0 of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The district court found for the plaintiffs and the
Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The court held that UGA's admissions
policy failed strict scrutiny and violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. " However, the Johnson court did not
decide what it called the "initial question:" Is student body diversity
a compelling governmental interest that satisfies strict scrutiny review
in constitutional analyses? 2 Although the end result in Johnson is
correct, the court's refusal to address the issue of diversity as a
compelling interest has only served to add to the chaos that has
become affirmative action in the context of higher education.
This article will address three questions: (1) Is the diversity issue
an open question, or in other words, is Bakke binding?; (2) If diversity
has any place in university admissions policies, can race be a factor
in diversity plans?; and (3) Should the Eleventh Circuit have resolved
the diversity issue in Johnson? Part I of this article discusses the
source of the problem, the controversial decision of Regents of the
University of California v. Bakke.13 Part II sets out the facts and
procedural background of Johnson and the Eleventh Circuit's
holding. Part III addresses the current circuit split as to the proper
interpretation of Bakke and further discusses whether diversity is a
compelling interest. Part IV examines the current "assumption" trend
that some courts are following and the resulting problems of this
analysis. Part V examines race as an unacceptable discriminatory tool
and further discusses the Johnson court's analysis of race as a factor
in UGA's admissions decisions. Part VI focuses on the Johnson
court's treatment of the diversity issue and further discusses whether
the court should have made an attempt to resolve it. It will be shown
that, although Johnson did not affirmatively provide an answer to the
8. Id.
9. .263 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2001).
10. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (1 1th
Cir. 2001).
12. Id. at 1244.
13. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
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diversity issue, the Eleventh Circuit followed constitutional tenet in
its decision. While this article focuses on the Johnson court's
analysis, it is meant to have much broader implications. The
discussion and analysis shows how future courts are likely to resolve
the diversity issue, or more accurately, not to resolve it at all.
I. To UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM IS TO UNDERSTAND ITS
FOUNDATION: REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V.
BAKKE
The question of whether diversity is a compelling interest that will
satisfy strict scrutiny review is one that arises from the United States
Supreme Court case of Regents of the University of California v.
Bakke. 4 The issue in Bakke was whether the Medical School of the
University of California at Davis' admissions policy was
unconstitutional because it reserved sixteen out of one hundred places
for minority applicants. 5 The California Supreme Court held that the
university's admissions policy violated the Equal Protection Clause. 6
In a five-to-four ruling, the United States Supreme Court found
the policy refusing Bakke's admission into the medical school was
invalid; however, it reversed the lower courts' decision enjoining the
university from ever considering race as a factor in future admissions
decisions.' 7 Specifically, Justices Powell, Stevens, Burger, Stewart,
and Rehnquist affirmed the finding that the policy was invalid and
ordered Bakke admitted. However, a different majority, made up of
Justices Powell, Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, reversed
the California Supreme Court's injunction of the university's
consideration of race in the policy. 8
Justice Powell supplied the deciding vote for both holdings of the
Court. In his opinion, Justice Powell found the university's goal of
obtaining diversity in its student body to be a compelling interest. 19
No other Justice joined in this part of Justice Powell's opinion.
Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist did not reach this
issue and instead found the admissions policy invalid on other
grounds.2" Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, while
14. Id., 98 S. Ct. 2733.
15. Id., 98 S. Ct. at 2733.
16. Id. at 271, 98 S. Ct. 2738.
17. Id. at 271-72, 98 S.Ct. 2738.
18. Id. at 272, 98 S.Ct. at 2738.
19. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314, 98 S. Ct. at 2761.
20. Id. at 421, 98 S. Ct. at 2815. These Justices found that the policy violated
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. It provides in pertinent part: "No
person.., shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
2002]
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
agreeing that some uses of race in university admissions policies are
permissible, did not decide whether diversity was a compelling state
interest because they did not use the strict scrutiny standard of
review." Specifically, this group of Justices determined that
classifications based on race must be substantially related to
achieving an important governmental objective.22 Therefore, the only
Justice who found student body diversity to be a compelling interest
was Justice Powell. This dispute continues today and is evident in
Johnson.
I. JOHNSON v. BOARD OF REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF GEORGIA
A. Factual and Procedural Background
In 1969, the Office of Civil Rights (the "OCR") declared that
"past patterns of racial segregation have not been eliminated from
most of the institutions within" Georgia's university system.23 The
following year the OCR ordered the Board of Regents to implement
affirmative action plans to alleviate this problem." These affirmative
action programs sought to increase the number of African-Americans
enrolled in Georgia's educational institutions. 25 Progress was made.
In 1989, the OCR found that Georgia's university system "had
substantially complied with the prescribed remedial measures."26
Therefore, Georgia's system of public higher education complied
with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and no additional
desegregation measures were required by the OCR.27
The claim against the University of Georgia's Board of Regents
stemmed from the university's 1996 revised freshman class
admissions policy. This policy divided the admissions process into
three stages. 8 The three stages were: (1) the "First Notice" stage, (2)
the "Total Student Index" or "TSI" stage, and (3) the "Edge Read" or
"ER" stage.
29
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 42 U.S.C. §
2000d (1994).
21. Id. at 359, 98 S.Ct. at 2783.
22. Id., 98 S.Ct. at 2783. This is an intermediate level of constitutional review,
whereas strict scrutiny review is the highest level of review a court will use to
determine if a state action is unconstitutional.
23. Johnson, 263 F.3d 1234, 1239-40(llth Cir. 2001).
24. Id. at 1240.
25. Id. The court in Johnson stated that these institutions were "traditionally






UGA selected the majority of its freshman class in the "First
Notice" stage. Under the policy, UGA granted admission
automatically to those prospective students whose SAT scores are at
least 450 Verbal, 450 Math, and 1000 overall and whose academic
indexes (AIs) are 2.86 or above.3 ° The AI consisted of grade point
average and quality of curriculum. The program then divided the
remaining applications into two groups. The group of applicants with
an AI of at least 2.40 and SAT scores of at least 950 overall, 430 on
Verbal, and 400 on Math proceeded to the "TSI" stage.3' The
University automatically rejected the group of applicants with scores
that fall below the minimum AI or SAT requirements.32
Under the "TSI" stage, the university expressly considered an
applicant's race.33 In addition to the SAT score, GPA, and quality of
curriculum, the university considered five "leadership/activity" or
"other" factors and three demographic factors in determining whether
an applicant would be admitted, rejected, or passed to the final stage.
The five leadership/activity or other factors were: (1) parent or
sibling ties to UGA, (2) hours spent on extracurricular activities, (3)
hours spent on summer work, (4) hours spent on school-year work,
and (5) first-generation college. The three demographic factors were:
(1) race/ethnicity, (2) gender, and (3) Georgia residency. The "TSI"
stage awarded a non-Caucasian a point credit of 0.5.31 Moreover, the
SAT score, which awarded a point credit of 1.0, was the only other
factor in the TSI equation that awarded more than the race factor.35
In the "TSI" stage, those applicants with "TSI" scores of 4.93 or
higher were automatically admitted and those applicants with "TSI"
scores below 4.66 were automatically rejected." Applicants whose
scores fell between 4.66 and 4.92 passed to the final stage.37
In the "ER" stage, those applicants still in the pool started with a
score of zero.38 Consequently, the admissions officers evaluated the
remaining applicants "on an individual basis., 39 The officers
30. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1241 (1 th Cir. 2001).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. Specifically, this stage combined weighted scores of academic,
extracurricular, demographic, and other factors.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Johnson, 263 F.3d at1241 (11th Cir. 2001).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1240.
39. Id. "Notably, the ER stage is the only stage in the freshman admissions
process where an applicant's file is actually read and qualitatively evaluated by
admissions officers rather than being processed mechanically based upon the data
specifically requested by the application form and inputted by the applicant." Id. at
1241.
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"look[ed] for qualities that might not have been apparent at the First
Notice and TSI stages." These admissions officers individually read
every applicant's file and admitted those prospective students who
met the "ER" requirements.4 More importantly, however, race was
not a designated factor at the ER stage.
2
The plaintiffs, three Caucasian female applicants, filed suit in
federal district court alleging that UGA's 1999 freshman admissions
policy43 discriminated against them based on race." Because the
plaintiffs were Caucasian, UGA did not grant them the 0.5 racial
credit given to minority applicants. Consequently, their scores fell
below the minimum TSI score,4 and plaintiffs were denied
admission.46 During the litigation, President of UGA, Michael
Adams, presented a speech "in which he state[d], 'I remain
committed to diversity . . . and particularly to increasing the
representation of African-Americans within the University of Georgia
student body."" 7 The district court rejected the university's diversity
argument and held that the promotion of student body diversity in
higher education was not a compelling interest.4" The district court
granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs,49 and the university
appealed to the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Opinion
The Eleventh Circuit divided the analysis into two parts: 1)
"whether student body diversity may be a compelling interest" ° and
2) "if so, whether UGA has met its burden of showing that its policy
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest."" The court first recognized
40. Id. at 1240.
41. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1240-41 (1 1th Cir. 2001). Because plaintiffs in this
case did not pass the TSI stage, the exact numbers for the ER stage were not
provided.
42. Id. at 1241.
43. "The framework of the revised [1996] policy is the same as that of the 1999
policy at issue today." Id. at 1240.
44. Johnson v. Bd. ofRegents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (S.D.
Ga. 2000). The plaintiffs claimed the policy violated 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (Title VI),
and 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (Title IX).
45. The minimum "TSI" number was 4.66. Johnson, 106 F. Supp. 2d at 1366.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1371. President Adams continued, "UGA wants to be fair, it wants
to be accessible, it wants to be representative of the total population of the state."
Id.
48. Id. at 1375.
49. Id. at 1381.




"that UGA's policy was subject to strict constitutional scrutiny."52
Therefore, "UGA's burden in this case was substantial," and UGA
was required to prove that its freshman admissions policy was
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest.53
The court began its analysis by determining UGA's asserted
compelling interest. Specifically, the court stated "UGA identifies
the educational benefits of student body diversity in higher education
as the compelling interest justifying the consideration of race in its
freshman admissions decisions., 54 The court then asked whether
student body diversity is a compelling interest, but concluded, "[it]
need not.., resolve in this opinion whether student body diversity
ever may be a compelling interest ..."5 Rather, the court determined
that "UGA's. . . policy is unconstitutional because UGA has plainly
failed to show that its policy is narrowly tailored to serve that interest
... even assuming that UGA's asserted interest in student body
diversity is a compelling interest."56
The court then moved to the second part of its analysis. In
determining that UGA's admissions policy was not narrowly tailored
to serve a compelling interest, the court stated that "some aspects of
[the diversity] issue are relevant to our narrow tailoring analysis.""
Thus, the Eleventh Circuit discussed that issue51 in depth.
The court's discussion focused on Justice Powell's separate
opinion in Bakke.59 The Eleventh Circuit in Johnson recognized that
"Justice Powell [wrote] solely for himself' in his opinion in Bakke
when he "clearly identified diversity as a compelling interest that may
be asserted by a university in defense of an admissions policy... "'
In addition, the Johnson court stated "the fact is inescapable that no
five Justices in Bakke expressly held that student body diversity is a
compelling interest under the Equal Protection Clause... "61 Thus,
52. Id. at 1243. "Both the Supreme Court and our Court have made clear that
racial classifications, whatever the motivation for enacting them, are highly suspect
and rarely withstand constitutional scrutiny." Id.
53. Id. at 1244.
54. Id.. The Court noted that "UGA does not identify remediating past
discrimination as the compelling interest justifying its policy." Id.
55. Id.
56. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1244-45.
57. Id. at 1245.
58. The issue was whether diversity is a recognized compelling interest that
satisfies strict scrutiny. Specifically, the Court stated, "we would be remiss if we
did not address the issue at all." Id.
59. 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978).
60. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1246.
61. Id. at 1248. For example, the Court noted Justice Brennan's opinion "did
not consider whether student body diversity constitute[s] a compelling interest
sufficient to justify the university's discriminatory admissions policy." Id. at 1246.
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it "is an open question, and... one that ... warrants consideration by
the Supreme Court."6 In spite of this, the Eleventh Circuit elected to
follow other "courts [who] have simply assumed that student body
diversity is a compelling interest, and then proceeded to explain why
the policy being challenged is unlawful regardless., 63 Therefore, the
court assumed, for purposes of this case only, that diversity is a
compelling interest so it could determine the constitutionality of
UGA's policy, using the narrowly tailored analysis.' 4
In its narrowly tailored analysis, the court followed Tuttle v.
Arlington County School Board, a Fourth Circuit decision. Tuttle
adopted factors from United States v. Paradise,66 a Supreme Court
decision in an employment affirmative action case. In Tuttle, the
Court "evaluat[ed] whether a local school district's race-conscious
admissions policy was narrowly tailored. '67 The Paradise factors
considered in Tuttle to determine whether the policy was narrowly
tailored were: "(1) the efficacy of alternative race-neutral policies, (2)
the planned duration of the policy, (3) the relationship between the
numerical goal and the percentage of minority group members in the
population or work force, (4) the flexibility of the policy including the
provision of waivers if the goal cannot be met, and (5) the burden of
the policy on third parties. '' 68 The Eleventh Circuit considered the
Paradise factors as "general guidance" but tailored them slightly to
fit the Johnson case. 6 The court stated that in
evaluating a[n] admissions program designed to serve a
compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits
associated with a diverse student body, [one] should examine:
(1) whether the policy uses race in a rigid or mechanical way
that does not take sufficient account of the different
contributions to diversity that individual candidates may
offer; (2) whether the policy fully and fairly takes account of
Reference is also made to Justice Stevens's opinion in which he also did not decide
the diversity issue. Id. at 1247.
62. Id. at 1245.
63. Id. at 1251 (citing Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d
123 (4th Cir. 1999); Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir.
1999); and Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998)).
64. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1251. The court stated, "The Supreme Court has
placed as much importance on the requirement that any race-conscious program be
narrowly tailored as it has on the requirement that the asserted justification for race-
conscious decision-making be sufficiently compelling." Id.
65. 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
66. 480 U.S. 149, 107 S.Ct. 1053 (1987).
67. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1252.
68. Id. (citing Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 706, citing Paradise, U.S. at 171, 107 S. Ct.
at 1066) (internal quotation marks omitted).
69. Id.
NOTES
race-neutral factors which may contribute to a diverse student
body; (3) whether the policy gives an arbitrary or
disproportionate benefit to members of the favored racial
groups; and (4) whether the school has genuinely considered,
and rejected as inadequate, race-neutral alternatives for
creating student body diversity.70
The court then discussed each factor with respect to UGA's policy
and found that the policy was not narrowly tailored under these
factors.7' Specifically, the court found that UGA's policy was
inflexible because it mechanically awarded a bonus to all. non-
Caucasian applicants, a bonus the court said was wholly arbitrary.72
The court also found that UGA did not consider race-neutral
alternatives that could contribute to diversity.
73
The court concluded its analysis of UGA's admissions policy by
affirming the district court's summary judgment in favor of the
Plaintiffs. However, it is important to note that the court reached this
conclusion "not because student body diversity can never be a
compelling interest ... but rather because the policy is not narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 7 4
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE INTERPRETATION OF BAKKE
A. The Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit's holding in Hopwood v. State of Texas75 is
presently the only case to hold that student body diversity is not a
compelling interest. This case addressed non-minority applicants'
claims that the University of Texas Law School's admissions policy
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
After briefly summarizing the separate opinions in Bakke, the
Fifth Circuit concluded that "none of the four other justices would go
the extra step proposed by Justice Powell and approve student body
diversity as a justification for a race-based admissions criterion." 6
Specifically, the Fifth Circuit followed the Hopwood 1177 decision in
the case's second appeal, and stated that "once the Hopwood Ipanel
determined to decide the case on the question of compelling state
70. Id. at 1253.
71. Id. at 1254.
72. Id. at 1254, 1257.
73. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1255.
74. Id. at 1264.
75. 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000). This case represents the third appeal.
76. Id. at 275.
77. Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996). This case represents the
second appeal which affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits.
2002]
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interest and not ... on the question of narrow tailoring, the panel was
constrained in its judgment only by other Supreme Court decisions
and by the text of the Constitution itself."7 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit interpreted Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke as not binding.79
Consequently, the court did not need to address whether the policy
was narrowly tailored to serve any compelling interest because the
University of Texas's interest was not compelling. The United States
Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari.
B. The Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith v. University of Washington
Law School"' contradicts Hopwood. The Smith court specifically
ruled that "educational diversity is a compelling governmental
interest that meets the demands of strict scrutiny of race-conscious
measures."8 2 Like Hopwood, this case addressed applicants' claims
against the University of Washington Law School alleging that the
law school's admissions policy discriminated based on race and
violated the Equal Protection Clause.
The Ninth Circuit found Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke was
binding precedent.8 3 Specifically, the court determined that Justice
Powell's analysis was the narrowest ground upon which a race-
conscious decision-making process could stand. 4 The court based its
decision on the rule in Marks v. United States that states "when a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court
may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in the judgments on the narrowest grounds."85 Since the
Smith court found Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke to be the
narrowest ground on which a judgment could stand, the court viewed
his opinion as binding precedent.
78. Hopwood, 236 F.3d at 275.
79. Id. Indeed, "some may think it was imprudent for the [court] to venture
into uncharted waters by declaring the diversity rationale invalid, but the panel's
holding clearly does not conflict directly with controlling Supreme Court
precedent." Id. The Fifth Circuit also explicitly rejected the Ninth Circuit's
holding in Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000), that Justice
Powell's diversity rationale is binding Supreme Court precedent. Id.
80. Texas v. Hopwood, 533 U.S. 929, 121 S.Ct.2550 (2001).
81. 233 F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000).
82. Id. at 1201.
83. Id. The court noted "at our level of the judicial system Justice Powell's
opinion remains the law." Id.
84. Id. at 1200.
85. Id. at 1199 (citing Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 97 S.Ct. 990
(1977)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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The Smith court noted that even though "the [Supreme] Court has
not looked upon race-based factors with much favor," it "has [also]
not returned to the area of university admissions. ' W Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit adopted Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke and
identified diversity as a compelling governmental interest. The court
concluded by suggesting that a properly designed and operated race-
conscious admissions program would not be in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment." As in Hopwood, the United States
Supreme Court denied a writ of certiorari in Smith.8
C. The Open Question: Is Diversity a Compelling Interest?
The question has puzzled scholars, lawyers, and judges. Each has
searched for an answer in judicial opinions, law review articles, and
books. Perhaps only one entity can provide the answer-the United
States Supreme Court. After all, the problem stems from one of its
own-Regents of the University of California v. Bakke. 9
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has refused to answer what
undoubtedly may be considered one of the most troubling
constitutional questions of interpretation since the Bakke decision.
1. Support for the Proposition that Diversity is Not a
Compelling Interest
Much support exists for the idea that diversity is not compelling.
As discussed, the Hopwood court crossed the boundaries when it
pronounced its decision in 2000.90 Further, this position is reinforced
by many courts and scholars in America who agree with the notion
that Justice Powell's separate opinion in Bakke is not binding
Supreme Court precedent.
Grutter v. Bollinger9' addressed the constitutionality of the
University of Michigan Law School's admissions policy. Plaintiff,
a rejected applicant, alleged that the law school used race as its
predominant factor in its admissions policy.9 Plaintiff ultimately
asserted that the law school discriminated against her on the basis of
86. Id. at 1200.
87. Id. at 1201.
88. 532 U.S. 1051, 121 S.Ct. 2192 (2001).
89. 438 U.S. 256, 98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). The Johnson Court stated "[i]n over
150 pages of the U.S. Reports, the Justices [in Bakke] have told us mainly that they
have agreed to disagree." Johnson, 263 F.3d 1234, 1248 (1 1th Cir. 2001) (citing
United States v. City of Miami, 614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980)).
90. See text accompanying supra note 79.
91. 137 F. Supp. 2d 821 (E.D. Mich. 2001).
92. Id.
2002]
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race.93 The Grutter court attacked the diversity issue on the very
ground on which the Ninth Circuit in Smith relies. It held the Marks
analysis inapplicable to Bakke. Specifically, it determined that "the
Marks framework cannot be applied to a case like Bakke, where the
various Justices' reasons for concurring in the judgment... are so
fundamentally different as to not be comparable in terms of
'narrowness."' 94 The Grutter court emphasized that the separate
opinions in Bakke were completely different rationales.95 Therefore,
the framework articulated in Marks "is inapplicable because the
varying positions [of the Justices] cannot be compared for
'narrowness."' 96  Consequently, the Smith argument that Justice
Powell's opinion is binding precedent is weakened by this rejection
of the Marks analysis' applicability to Bakke. As a result of this
analysis, the Grutter court concluded that "Bakke does not stand for
the proposition that a university's desire to assemble a racially diverse
student body is a compelling state interest."'97
Although they are not higher education cases, the post-Bakke
decisions of the Supreme Court also reinforce the proposition that
diversity is not compelling.98 Indeed, these cases suggest the only
remaining compelling state interest is to remedy the present effects of
past discrimination. The most important post-Bakke case is City of
Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co. " In Croson, the United States
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice O'Connor, stated that
"unless [classifications based on race] are strictly reserved for
93. Id.
94. Id. at 847.
95. Id.
96. Id. The "narrowest grounds" analysis suggests a case where varying
opinions, while all concurring in the judgment, "can be placed on a continuum from
narrow to broad" thus, suggesting an overlap between the different rationales.
Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 847.
97. Id. at 848.
98. In Grutter, the court refers to Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S.
200, 115 S.Ct. 2097 (1995) and City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S.
469, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989) as the two post-Bakke cases of the Supreme Court that
support this idea. It states, "Adarand and Croson clearly indicate that racial
classifications are unconstitutional unless they are intended to remedy carefully
documented effects of past discrimination." Grutter, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 848-49.
99. B. Andrew Bednark, Note, Preferential Treatment: The Varying
Constitutionality of Private Scholarship Preferences at Public Universities, 85
Minn. L. Rev. 1391, 1410 (2001). See also William C. Kidder, Does the LSAT
Mirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic Differences in Educational Attainment?: A
Study ofEqually Achieving "Elite" College Students, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1055, 1120-
21 (2001) ("Supporters of affirmative action would be wise to cover their bases by
supplementing their defense of the diversity rationale with proof of prior
discrimination .... ).
100. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
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remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility.''. Thus, Croson
may be interpreted to stand for the proposition that "the interest in a
diverse student body may be unacceptable to courts."102
The United States Supreme Court has had two opportunities to do
away with the idea that diversity is not a compelling state interest.
The Court refused to grant certiorari in Texas v. Hopwood."3
Although a refusal to grant certiorari does not suggest any opinion of
the Supreme Court, this refusal to review Hopwood "has left many
analysts wondering about the future of Bakke.""W4 Additionally, the
Fifth Circuit in Lesage v. State of Texas0 5 rejected student body
diversity as a compelling governmental interest in determining
whether the University of Texas's admissions policy for its doctoral
program in counseling psychology discriminated against applicants
based on race."° Ultimately, the Supreme Court reversed the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Texas v. Lesage.'0 7 However, the reversal was
based on standing, not on the question of diversity. The Court
seemingly suggests that it will not disturb the Fifth Circuit's holding
that student body diversity is not a compelling interest.
Hopwood has many supporters. Indeed, caselaw indicates that
diversity does not constitute a compelling governmental interest.'l '
The post-Bakke decisions of the Supreme Court suggest diversity is
not a compelling interest as well. Therefore, it is arguable that "the
diversity rationale for affirmative action may soon be rejected or
curtailed by the Supreme Court." ''9
101. Id. at 493-94, 109 S.Ct. at 722.
102. Bednark, supra note 99, at 1410.
103. 533 U.S. 929, 121 S.Ct. 2550 (2001).
104. Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Piercing the Veil: William J. Brennan's
Account ofRegents of the University of California v. Bakke, 19 Yale L. & Pol. Rev.
341, 371 (2001).
105. 158 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 1998), rev'd on other grounds by Texas v. Lesage,
528 U.S. 18, 120 S.Ct. 467 (1999).
106. Id. The Fifth Circuit stated, "'Diversity,' the justification given for the
University's use of racial preferences, is not a compelling state interest that satisfies
the strict scrutiny standard for the purpose of admissions at a public university."
Lesage, 158 F.3d at 221.
107. 528 U.S. 18, 120 S.Ct. 467 (1999).
108. Other cases supporting this proposition include Lutheran Church-Missouri
Synod v. Fed. Communications Comm'n, 141 F.3d 344,354 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("We
do not think diversity can be elevated to the 'compelling' level.... ."); Taxman v.
Bd. of Educ. of the Township ofPiscataway, 91F.3d 1547 (3d Cir. 1996) (court did
not endorse diversity as a compelling interest in the employment context pursuant
to Title VII); and Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.3d 123, 130
(4th Cir. 1999) ("No inference may here be taken that we are of opinion that racial
diversity is a compelling governmental interest.").
109. William C. Kidder, Does the LSATMirror or Magnify Racial and Ethnic
2002] NOTES 139
LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
2. Support for the Proposition that Diversity is a Compelling
Interest
Support also exists for the idea that diversity is a compelling
interest. The Ninth Circuit's decision in Smith is perhaps the biggest
contribution to this belief. This position is further supported by other
courts and scholars who conclude that Justice Powell's opinion in
Bakke is binding Supreme Court precedent.
The problem of race in university admissions decisions extends
back to the 1950 case of Sweatt v. Painter."0 In Sweatt, the Supreme
Court found that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment required the University of Texas Law School to admit
Sweatt, an applicant who sought a writ of mandamus to compel his
admission into the law school."' Sweatt sought admission to the
University of Texas Law School because the law school for African
Americans at that time was not substantially equal to the state law
school for Caucasians." 2 Specifically, the Plaintiff claimed that the
educational opportunities afforded Caucasian law students were not
equal to those afforded African American law students. Thus, the
University of Texas Law School's decision not to admit Sweatt
violated the Equal Protection Clause. In its opinion, the Court did not
consider whether diversity maybe a compelling state interest because
the standard was not developed at the time the case was decided.
However, dicta suggests that diversity is an integral part of any
student body. It noted that the legal profession is a practical one that
cannot be effective if isolated from the environment in which it
practices." 3 The Court found that the law school for African
Americans excluded from its student body members of the racial
groups that make up eighty five percent of the Texas population." 4
The Court called this environment an "academic vacuum," one in
which no student or practicing lawyer would choose to learn. "5 The
Court recognized that this environment was "removed from the
interplay of ideas and the exchange of views with which the law is
concerned."'6 Because an applicant inevitably deals with a diverse
population in practice, the Court arguably suggests that only a diverse
student body will wholly prepare a student for practice after law
Differences in Educational Attainment?: A Study of Equally Achieving "Elite"
College Students, 89 Calif. L. Rev. 1055, 1120 (2001).
110. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70 S.Ct. 848 (1950).
111. Id., 70 S. Ct. at 848.
112. Id., 70,S. Ct. at 848.
113. Id. at 634, 70 S. Ct. at 850.
114: Id., 70 S. Ct. at 850.
115. Id., 70 S. Ct. at 850.
116. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634, 70 S. Ct. at 850.
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school. The Court in Sweatt furthered the proposition that diversity
is necessary for effective lawyering and, consequently, may raise
diversity to the compelling level.
The district court in Gratz v. Bollinger"7 held that student body
diversity was a compelling governmental interest that satisfied strict
scrutiny review. One of the issues in Gratz was whether the
University of Michigan's practice of reserving seats for minority
applicants in the College of Literature, Science, and the Arts from
1995 to 1998 violated the Equal Protection Clause. The court found
that the university used a "protected seats" system."' Under this
system, a specific number of seats were set aside for "under-
represented minority candidates."" 9 As a result, these minority
applicants were insulated from competition from non-minority
applicants. The court found this policy to be the functional equivalent
of a quota system which violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 20
In its opinion the Gratz court fully discussed the diversity issue
and concluded diversity was compelling. In support of this
contention, the court cited several studies that have found a diverse
student body to yield tremendous educational benefits. These
findings showed that "students learn better in a diverse educational
environment, and they are better prepared to become active
participants in our pluralistic, democratic society once they leave such
a setting."'' The court also recognized that diversity serves to break
patterns of racial segregation historically rooted in our society.'22 By
indicating that student body diversity enhances the quality of
education, these findings supported the possibility that diversity may
be compelling.
The Gratz court also distinguished diversity in the higher
education context from the remedial setting. As discussed, opponents
of labeling diversity a compelling interest argue the only compelling
interest is remedying the present effects of past discrimination."'
This position comes from Justice O'Connor's opinion in Croson
where the issue specifically dealt with remedying the effects of past
discrimination, that is, a remedial setting, not diversity. The Gratz
court weakened the argument that remedying the effects of past
discrimination is the only compelling interest. The Gratz court
117. 122 F. Supp. 2d 811, 824 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
118. ld.at831.
119. Id. The policy also reserved seats for in-state students and certain other
groups such as athletes, foreign applicants, and ROTC candidates.
120. Id. at 832. However, the court went on to uphold the university's current
admissions policy.
121. Id. at 822.
122. Id.
123. See text accompanying supra notes 98 and 99.
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identified diversity in higher education as a "permanent and ongoing
interest" and remedying the effects of past discrimination as a
temporary interest." 4 Specifically, the court stated, "unlike the
remedial setting, where the need for remedial action terminates once
the effects of past discrimination have been eradicated, the need for
diversity lives on perpetually." 2 5 Additionally, diversity is a non-
remedial purpose. Since the Croson court did not consider whether
a non-remedial purpose could ever constitute a compelling interest,
its holding may be limited to remedial settings.'26 Therefore,
diversity may be compelling because of its permanency in the
higher education context.
3. The Open Question
Support exists on both sides of the argument. Hopwood stands
for the proposition that diversity is not a compelling interest, while
Smith holds diversity is a compelling interest. The respective
circuits have their followers. Grutter follows the Fifth Circuit's
Hopwood decision, while Gratz follows the Ninth Circuit's Smith
decision.
The rationales behind the two arguments have also been
attacked. The court in Grutter found the Marks analysis, on which
Smith relies, inapplicable to the separate opinions in Bakke. Thus,
the Smith decision that diversity is compelling is questionable.
However, Hopwood's holding that diversity is not compelling is
also debatable. The rationale behind the notion that diversity is not
compelling was questioned in Gratz when it distinguished the
diversity context from a remedial setting. Thus, the idea that
remedying the effects of past discrimination remains the only
compelling interest may be unpersuasive to courts and proponents
of the educational and societal benefits of diversity. In short, the
question whether diversity is a compelling interest is an open
question. However, one cannot ignore that no five Justices in the
Bakke decision agreed as to whether diversity constitutes a
compelling interest. Importantly, no other Justice expressly agreed
with Justice Powell when he pronounced diversity a compelling
interest. Therefore, the issue will remain debatable until the
Supreme Court decides to put an end to the constitutional chaos
surrounding the correct interpretation of Bakke.
124. Gratz, 122 F. Supp. 2d at 823-24.
125. Id. at 824.
126. See generally Victor G. Rosenblum, Surveying the Current Legal
Landscape for Affirmative Action in Admissions, 27 J.C. & U.L. 709, 720 (2001).
See also Brewer v. W. Irondequoit Central Sch. Dist., 212 F.3d 738 (2d Cir. 2000).
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IV. THE "ASSUMPTION DODGE" AND THE PROBLEMS THAT RESULT
A. The "Assumers"
1. The Fourth Circuit
The Fourth Circuit has had opportunities to answer whether
diversity is a compelling interest. The issue in Tuttle v. Arlington
County School Board'27 was whether the school board's admissions
policy for the Arlington Traditional School violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school at issue
was "an alternative kindergarten" where "admission is not based upon
merit but rather solely upon availability."' 28 However, because "the
applicant pool was larger than the number of available positions," the
school based admission on a lottery.'29 Under this lottery system,
"applicants from under-represented groups . . .had an increased
probability of selection.""' As a result, Plaintiffs brought suit
claiming "the weighted lottery" violated their Equal Protection rights.
The Fourth Circuit faced the question of whether the school could
constitutionally implement a lottery system, in which a higher
probability of selection attached to under-represented groups, "to
promote racial and ethnic diversity in its student body."' 3' There is
no question that the school's goal was "not to remedy past
discrimination, but rather to promote ... diversity." '32 The court
recognized the district court held "that as a matter of law, diversity is
not a compelling interest because the only compelling governmental
interest to justify racial classifications is remedying the effects of past
",133discrimination. However, the Fourth Circuit rejected this
conclusion by the district court and assumed, without so holding, that
diversity may be a compelling governmental interest.
34
Consequently, the court determined the constitutionality of the
admissions policy through the narrowly tailored analysis. Like
Johnson, the Fourth Circuit left "the question of whether diversity is
a compelling interest unanswered.""'
127. Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd., 195 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 1999).
128. Id. at 701.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 702.
131. Id. at 700.
132. Id. The February 1998 policy had two goals: "(1) to prepare and educate
students to live in a diverse, global society by reflecting the diversity of the
community and (2) to help the School Board serve the diverse groups of students
in the district... ." Tuttle, 195 F.3d at 701.
133. Id. at 703.
134. Id. at 705.
135. Id.
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In another Fourth Circuit case, Eisenberg v. Montgomery County
Public Schools, 136 the court considered whether the Montgomery
County Board of Education's, transfer policy violated Equal
Protection. The Plaintiff, a Caucasian transfer applicant, was denied
admission to a magnet school by the school board based on the
policy's diversity profile. Specifically, "according to the Transfer
Booklet, 'transfers that negatively affect diversity are usually
denied.'" 37 As a result, the Plaintiff s parents brought suit on behalf
of the denied applicant.
Like the district court in Tuttle, the district court in Eisenberg
answered the diversity issue. It concluded that Montgomery County's
asserted interest in the diversity of its student body was a sufficiently
compelling governmental interest to justify the transfer policy's race
based classifications under strict scrutiny review. 13' However, the
Fourth Circuit followed Tuttle and chose not to answer the diversity
issue.'39 It again assumed, without holding, that diversity may be a
compelling interest for purposes of this case only. Furthermore, the
court resolved the case by examining whether the transfer policy was
narrowly tailored to achieve diversity, the purported compelling
interest. 4 ° The Fourth Circuit was clear in its decision to leave the
question of whether diversity is a compelling interest for another
court. By rejecting the determination of their respective district
courts, the Fourth Circuit fuels the confusion that exists among the
circuits today, the correct interpretation of Bakke.
2. The First Circuit
In Wessmann v. Gittens,'4' the admissions policy in question
allegedly discriminated against applicants based on race. The
Plaintiffs father challenged the constitutionality of Boston Latin
School's policy alleging that it violated his daughter's equal protection
rights.'42 The school's policy "makes race a determining factor in the
admission of a subset of each year's incoming classes ....,,3 The
school automatically grants half of its available seats of admission to
136. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d 123 (4th Cir. 1999).
137. Id. at 126. "[T]he transfer policy considers race as the sole determining
factor, absent a 'unique present hardship,' if the assigned school and the requested
school are both stable and their utilization/enrollment factor are acceptable for
transfers." Id. at 129.
138. Id. at 128.
139. Id. at 130. "[Iin this case, we also choose to leave it unresolved." Id.
140. Eisenberg, 197 F.3d at 130.
141. 160 F.3d 790 (lst Cir. 1998).
142. Id. at 791-92.
143. Id. at 792.
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those applicants who score above a composite score on a standardized
test.'" However, the other half of the available seats are allocated on
the basis of racial or ethnic guidelines which are determined by the
school. 4 As a result, the Plaintiff was not admitted to Boston Latin
School.
The district court took a definitive stand on the diversity issue. It
held that the School Committee's interest in promoting a diverse
student body was compelling."4 On appeal, the First Circuit
recognized the need for clarity concerning this issue.'47 However, it
refused the direction of the district court and left the question
unanswered. The court stated "we need not definitively resolve this
conundrum today" and "instead, ... assume arguendo-but we do not
decide-that... some iterations of 'diversity' might be sufficiently
compelling, in specific circumstances, to justify race-conscious
actions."' The words used by the court suggest that it sees little, if
nothing, left of the diversity argument. Its analysis of this
"conundrum," while attempting to express the need for a resolution by
the Supreme Court, adds more confusion to this "chiaroscuro
backdrop."' 1
49
Although the Wessmann court assumed for its purposes that
diversity was compelling, its dicta suggested otherwise. The court
noted that the word "diversity" is an abstract concept and declared that
"an inquiring court cannot content itself with abstractions. ' ' O Further,
"it would be cause for consternation were a court, without more, free
to accept a term as malleable as 'diversity' in satisfaction of the
compelling interest needed to justify governmentally-sponsored racial
distinctions."' Nevertheless, the court chose to follow, "albeit with
considerable skepticism," the decisions of Tuttle and Eisenberg. 2 The
First Circuit in Wessmann, however, is closer than other courts to
holding that diversity is not a compelling state interest.
144. Id. at 793.
145. Id. These guidelines are set by determining the relative proportions of
minorities in the remaining half of the applicants. The seats are then filled, "but the
number of students taken from each racial [minority] must match the proportion of
that minority in the remaining half of the applicants." Id. at 793.
146. Wessmann, 160 F.3d at 794.
147. Id. at 795. "The question of precisely what interests... justify race-based
classifications is largely unsettled." Id.
148. Id. at 796.
149. Id. "Chiaroscuro" is defined as "pictorial representation in terms of light
and shade without regard for or use of colors in the objects depicted; the quality of
being veiled or partly in shadow." Webster's Third New International Dictionary
Unabridged 386 (Philip Babcock Gove, Ph.D. ed., 1986).
150. Id. at 796-97.
151. Id. at 796.
152. Id. at 799.
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3. The Eleventh Circuit-A Preview to Johnson
Wooden v. Board ofRegents of the University System of Georgia' is
the predecessor of Johnson. The Eleventh Circuit in Wooden considered
whether the University of Georgia's admissions policy violated the Equal
Protection Clause based on claims of racial discrimination."M Plaintiff
alleged UGA gave non-Caucasians preferential treatment in its admissions
decisions.'55 The district court in this case, however, did not decide the
diversity issue. Rather, like the Fourth and First Circuits, it too determined
the constitutionality of UGA's policy under the narrowly tailored
analysis. 1
56
Like the court in Wessmann, the district court did suggest that
diversity is likely not compelling. The court "is not convinced that these
benefits-furthered here only in an abstract sense-justify outright
discriminatory admission practices."' 57 These discriminatorypractices, the
court explained, cause "concrete constitutional injuries. ' ' lS8 Specifically,
the court recognized that the Plaintiffwas prevented from competing on an
equal footing with other applicants because of his race.'59 The district court
in Wooden also noted that Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke is
questionable with regard to any precedential value."l
The Eleventh Circuit overruled the district court, although on different
grounds.' 6' Like the district court, the Eleventh Circuit's analysis did not
address whether diversity was a compelling interest. Therefore, the district
court's refusal to answer the diversity question remained untouched. With
this decision, the Eleventh Circuit set the stage for its decision in Johnson.
B. The Assumers 'Aftennath: What is the Correct Standard for
Courts and Universities?
"What is one to make of that fragmented decision of the Supreme
Court?"' 62 The confusion as to the proper interpretation of Bakke has
left courts and universities troubled. Specifically, "[courts] are left
153. 247 F.3d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
154. Id.
155. See generally supra Part II(A), discussing UGA's freshman admissions
policy.
156. Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 32 F. Supp. 2d 1370,
1382 (S.D. Ga. 1999). However, the case was ultimately decided on standing
grounds in Wooden v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (11 th
Cir. 2001).




161. Wooden, 247 F.3d at 1289. The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's
decision in part on the issue of standing.
162. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1199 (9th Cir. 2000).
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with the task of deciding just what the Supreme Court decided [in
Bakke] .,163 Further, universities are left with the unpredictable task
of producing constitutional race-based admissions policies. As a
result of the "assumers's" decisions not to provide an answer to the
diversity issue, "both the vitality and meaning of the Bakke decision
continue to be actively litigated with the future of race-conscious
admissions programs hanging in the balance."'"
Courts need constitutional guidelines. In an area that affects so
many people with different beliefs, this is especially important.
Presently, "the current legal landscape for affirmative action is
bleak."' 5 Contradictory opinions have left the issues unsettled.'66 As
a result, courts are confused as to "whether ... [analyses of Bakke
and other pertinent judicial decisions] have.., left the Bakke rulings
dangling in limbo."167 This confusion is reinforced by the decisions
in Tuttle, Eisenberg, Wessmann, and Wooden. By deciding their
constitutional issues through the narrowly tailored analysis, these
"assumers" allow room for more conflicting interpretations by future
courts faced with the issue. The need for guidance is evident. To
bring coherence to this troublesome constitutional arena, the issue of
diversity needs to be resolved. Universities and law schools also need
constitutional guidelines. Because of the continuing litigation of
race-based admissions policies, "a substantial number of America's
leading public universities and their affiliated law schools have
terminated race-sensitive affirmative action [plans]. '168 Hopwood,
Smith, Grutter, and the other district courts-who have affirmatively
provided guidance on the diversity issue-recognize too that a
university or law school must be guided by a constitutional standard
to apply to its own circumstances. Indeed, "at the heart of these cases
is an effort to adduce.., the permissible methods for universities to
structure admissions programs so as to achieve diversity.' ' 69 Tuttle,
Eisenberg, Wessmann, and Wooden give no such effort except
through their narrowly tailored analyses. As a result, promulgators of
admissions policies must search for ways to keep their interests
within the law while wondering if their work will be for nothing.
Courts and universities need guidance in the area of affirmative
action. In many cases, this guidance is not being provided. What are
future courts to do? Surely, they too may soon find themselves
163. Id. at 1198.
164. Epstein & Knight, supra note 104, at 344.
165. Rosenblum, supra note 126, at 709.
166. Id. at 722.
167. Id. at 710.
168. Kidder, supra note 109, at 1060-61.
169. Epstein & Knight, supra note 104, at 345.
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muddling through this constitutional chaos. And universities?
Indeed, most universities and law schools are presently feeling the
effect of this debate. Moreover, while struggling to come up with a
guiding standard, most courts and universities are braving "the
chilling effect of-threatened litigation."' 70
IV. RACE: THE AMERICAN DILEMMA
A. Race Should be Condemned as the Sole Factor in University
Diversity Programs
The question remains whether diversity constitutes a compelling
interest. Indeed, it is unquestionable that the benefits of diversity in
the educational setting are great. Diverse student bodies serve to
make students more aware of the extremely diverse society in which
they will live and work. But may race be used as a factor in
university diversity policies? The idea that any classification based on
race is inherently suspect and probably violative of the Fourteenth
Amendment implies race should not be used to diversify a student
body. Indeed, the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause is to not
deny anyone the equal protection of the laws. However, the Court in
Bakke expressly permits race to be one factor in university admissions
decisions as long as it is not the only factor.'7'
The post-Bakke Supreme Court decision of City of Richmond v.
J. A. Croson Co.172 reinforces the idea that race should not be the
predominant factor in university admissions decisions. In effect, it
undermines the Bakke decision by limiting the use of race-based
classifications in affirmative action plans to those that are designed
to remedy past discrimination. Absent a showing of an attempt to
remedy the effects of past discrimination by the university, race
should not be a factor at all. In Croson, the City of Richmond
adopted a program where city contractors were required to
subcontract at least thirty percent of each contract to minority-owned
business enterprises. 73 The City defined those minorities as "Blacks,
Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, or Aleuts."'' 74 The
plan prevented majority-owned businesses, such as the J. A. Croson
Co., from effectively competing with minority business enterprises
170. Kidder, supra note 109, at 1060.
171. See Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733
(1978). The opinion by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, joined
by Justice Powell, support this contention.
172. 488 U.S. 469, 109 S.Ct. 706 (1989).
173. Id., 109 S. Ct. 706.
174. Id. at 478, 109 S.Ct. at 713.
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for that thirty percent of work from every city contract. The Supreme
Court found this program unconstitutional."
The Court focused its holding on the lack of evidence
demonstrating that the City had ever racially discriminated against
minority-owned businesses. The Court indicated that if the City had
particularly identified specific acts of past discrimination, it could act
to remedy the discrimination. '76 However, no past discriminatory acts
by the City were proven. The Court expressed its agreement with
Justice Powell's view in Bakke when he stated, "[t]he guarantee of
equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one
individual and something else when applied to a person of another
color.""' The City effectively treated majority-owned businesses
differently in its attempt to guarantee equal protection to those
minority-owned businesses. Therefore, the City's use of racial
classifications in letting out its contracts violated the majority-owned
businesses' rights under the Equal Protection Clause.' The Court's
decision in Croson supports the idea that race should not be used in
university diversity policies. Unless the university specifically shows
the need to remedy the present effects of past discrimination, the
effect of classifying applicants based on race to achieve diversity is
to deny some groups equal protection.
The Fourteenth Amendment is the cornerstone of American
liberty and equality. Within this amendment, the Equal Protection
Clause guarantees to every person the equal protection of the laws. 79
Racial distinctions in any context, by their very nature, tear at this
constitutional guarantee. This is especially true in the context of
higher education. If the Equal Protection Clause treats every person
of every race equally, it follows that allowing race to be a factor in
admissions decisions denies to "unprotected" groups the opportunity
to compete equally with those protected groups for admissions seats.
When a university attempts to guarantee equal protection to minority
applicants by allowing race as a factor in its admissions decisions; it
is effectively denying equal protection to those non-minority
applicants. The Supreme Court has "consistently denied the
constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on
account of race."'"8 Allowing race to be a factor in admissions
175. Id., 109 S.Ct. 706.
176. Id., 109 S.Ct. 706.
177. Id. at 494, 109 S.Ct. at 722 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 289-90, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2748 (1978)).
178. Id., 109 S.Ct. 706.
179. See text accompanying supra note 4.
180. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11-12, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967).
However, see generally Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 121 S.Ct. 1452 (2001),
in which the Supreme Court permitted some use of race in establishing legislative
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policies based on diversity is one such measure which "violates the
central meaning of the Equal Protection Clause."18' However, race may
be a factor, although not the sole factor, in university diversity plans
upon a showing of the need to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination. Since diversity has never been held to the level of
compelling, the only way for an admissions policy, in which race is a
factor, to survive strict scrutiny is if the university shows a present need
to remedy past discrimination. Thus, the university is left with a high
burden. Not only does the university have to prove that some past
action discriminated against a certain race and this past action is
presently effecting its applicants, the university also must show its
admissions policy can pass the strict scrutiny test. That is, a university
must show that its admissions policy is necessary to remedy the effects
of some proven past discrimination.
The Supreme Court has supported classifications based on race
when the classification is to remedy the effects of past discrimination
in Croson and Bakke. Specifically, Justice O'Connor's opinion in
Croson supports this proposition. Justice O'Connor suggested that
classifications based on race should be strictly reserved for remedial
settings only.' 2 Furthermore, if racial classifications are used outside
of remedial settings, "they may in fact promote notions of racial
inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility."'8 3
In an opinion by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun,
and joined by Justice Powell, the Court in Bakke recognized that race
can be a factor in university admissions policies. '  The Court
expressed that "[g]ovemment may take race into account when it acts
.. . to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial
prejudice."'' 5 Since the issue in Bakke was in the context of higher
education, this opinion especially supports the conclusion that race may
be used in university diversity policies when the classification seeks to
remedy the present effects of past discrimination.
B. The Eleventh Circuit's Treatment of Race as a Factor in UGA 's
Admissions Policy
The Eleventh Circuit focused this part of its opinion on the notion
that to serve the goals of diversity, an admissions policy that takes race
districts.
181. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12, 87 S.Ct. at 1823.
182. City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493, 109 S.Ct. 706,
722 (1989).
183. Id., 109 S.Ct. at 722.
184. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 98 S.Ct. 2733(1978).
185. Id. at 325, 98 S.Ct. at 2766.
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into account must not assess each applicant as a member of a particular
racial group but rather as an individual.'86 That is, the university must
use race in as limited a manner as possible.'87 The court assumes that
race "may be one component of a diverse student body, [but] it is not
the only component." '88 However, the court does not follow the
opinion implied in Croson and Bakke that race may be used as a factor
in diversity programs but only to remedy the present effects of past
discrimination.
The Johnson court considered several factors'89 to determine
when race may be used to further the goal of diversity. First, the
court states that an admissions policy may consider race if it does so
with sufficient flexibility. 90 That is, the use of race must not be
subject to rigid or mechanical application in that it favors an
applicant's racial group as a deciding factor in the applicant's
candidacy for admission. It also must see that each applicant is
weighed as an individual and not weighed on account of race. The
court states as an example, "a university may not establish a quota
system for members of certain racial groups, and may not put
members of one racial group on a different and more lenient track
[towards admission] than members of another group."'1 9' UGA's
process of awarding the point bonus of 0.5 to minorities during the
admissions selection process was a "rigid, mechanical approach to
considering race. ' Therefore, the point bonus indicated extreme
inflexibility in UGA's policy.
Second, the Eleventh Circuit found that race may be considered
if the policy shows that race-neutral factors, which also contribute to
diversity, are fully and fairly considered along with race.' 93 The court
emphasized that the consideration of race in diversity was not the
only, or best, criteria for determining those aspects of an applicant
which seek to enhance overall student body diversity.'94 Indeed, race
is not the "hallmark of a diverse student body."' The court noted
certain aspects of one's lifestyle or life experiences as examples of
race-neutral factors that would enhance student diversity. UGA failed
to consider applicants who came from economically disadvantaged
186. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1253-54
( lIth Cir. 2001).
187. Id. at 1253.
188. Id.
189. Id. See also supra Part II(B) regarding the discussion of the Paradise
factors used in the Johnson court's analysis.
190. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1253.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1255.





homes, applicants who have lived or traveled abroad, applicants from
rural areas, applicants who speak foreign languages and applicants
who have overcome personal or social hardship."9 Since UGA's
policy excluded several race-neutral factors that would have enhanced
diversity in its student body, the court found the policy deficient and
incompatible with the need for the policy's flexibility.'97
Third, the Eleventh Circuit determined that a policy must use race
in a manner that does not provide an arbitrary benefit to applicants
from favored racial groups to justify using race at all in its selection
process. 98 The court found that UGA's policy was "wholly, and
concededly, arbitrary" in its use of the point bonus it awards to
minority applicants.'99 The court referred to this practice as a
substitute for assessing the applicant individually and found that the
university arbitrarily picked the 0.5 figure when determining how
much weight race should carry in the admissions process.2°°
Recognizing the complexities in placing a value on a racial
classification, the Johnson court still found the policy to be rigid and
incomplete.2"'
Fourth, and last, the court found that a policy that seeks to use
race as a diversity factor in its selection process must demonstrate
that the university has considered, and subsequently rejected, all race-
neutral alternatives for devising student diversity.2°2 It noted that race
may be used only as a last resort because "[r]ace-based decision-
making is at odds with the Constitution in any context., 203 The court
found that UGA failed to show it considered any alternatives to its
present policy.2°4 These alternatives are "[r]ecruiting, advertising,
financial incentives to admittees from less advantaged homes, and
other outreach strategies. '"205 In fact, UGA has been, and remains,
committed to explicitly using race in its admissions policy.2 6 The
court found an indication that UGA considered ways to increase its
enrollment of African-American students, but no evidence that UGA
sought to consider race-neutral means in its effort to enhance
diversity.2 7 Therefore, because UGA made no good faith
consideration of race-neutral alternatives to enhancing diversity other
196. Id. at 1255.
197. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1255.
198. Id. at 1253.
199. Id. at 1257.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Johnson, at 1253.
203. Id. at 1254.





than benefitting African American applicants with a mechanical point
bonus, the court found no justification with the policy's arbitrary use
of race in its admissions process.
Under these factors, the Johnson court concluded that UGA's
freshman admissions policy was not narrowly tailored to produce a
diverse student body. 08 However, the court did not follow the
suggestion in Bakke that race may only be used when a showing of
the need to remedy the effects of past discrimination exists. Rather,
the court employed factors used in Paradise, a case in the
employment affirmative action context. The Eleventh Circuit should
have limited its analysis to whether UGA demonstrated the need to
remedy the effects of some past discrimination. Then, the court
would not have had to wander into its lengthy discussion of whether
UGA's policy was narrowly tailored. Rather, it could have found the
policy did not satisfy the narrowly tailored analysis by only
determining if UGA identified some past discrimination on its part.
In not observing whether a need to remedy the effects of past
discrimination existed, the Eleventh Circuit exhausts itself in its
analysis and confuses further future courts' decisions on whether race
may be used as a factor in university diversity policies.
V. A CALL FOR HELP: SHOULD THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT HAVE
DECIDED THE DIVERSITY ISSUE?
Judge Marcus's opinion for the Eleventh Circuit began with the
court's brief treatment of the diversity issue. Specifically, the court
stated its "initial question, [], is when, if ever, may student body
diversity be a compelling interest?"'209 Immediately upon asking this
question, the court stated "[wie need not, and do not, resolve in this
opinion whether student body diversity ever may be a compelling
interest supporting a university's consideration of race in its
admissions process."2 10 The court instead chose to decide if the
university's admissions policy is unconstitutional based on whether
the program was narrowly tailored to achieve any compelling end.
Preliminarily, the court noted "there is no reason . . . to decide
whether or when student body diversity may be a compelling interest"
because even assuming diversity is a compelling interest, UGA's
admissions policy is not narrowly tailored to serve that interest."
Thus, the court avoided the most pivotal issue presented. However,
the Eleventh Circuit is not the only court to take this position.
208. Johnson, 263 F.3d at 1260.
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Indeed, "legal history demonstrates that the 'assumption dodge' has
been invoked by other courts."21
2
Even though the Eleventh Circuit refused to decide whether
diversity is a compelling interest, it, nevertheless, assumed diversity
is compelling and analyzed the issue in an attempt to justify its
conclusion that UGA's freshman admissions policy is not narrowly
tailored to the university's end. The court began this part of its
opinion with an examination of Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke.1 3
It noted that "Justice Powell, writing solely for himself,. . . found the
university's goal of 'attain[ing] a diverse student body' to be 'clearly'
a 'constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher
education. ,, 214 The court went further to say, however, that no other
Justice expressly endorsed that view.215 The court also discussed
Justice Brennan's opinion which did not consider whether student
body diversity constituted a compelling interest sufficient to justify
the university's discriminatory admissions policy. The court
concluded that it "shall [simply] assume for purposes of this opinion
only that UGA's asserted interest in student body diversity is a
compelling interest. 2 16  Since "courts elsewhere have simply
assumed that student body diversity is a compelling interest,"2 7 the
court chose to leave the question unanswered.
However, the district court specifically stated that "the Court has
no business traveling on assumptions but rather must face the
threshold issue, [diversity], head-on. Further, the district court
suggested that "the 'assumption' dodge ... has.., encouraged in the
affirmative action realm, encouraged nothing but endless rounds of
costly and divisive litigation. That cycle stops here. ,219
Should the Eleventh Circuit have followed the decision-making
skills of the district court? In other words, should the Eleventh Circuit
212. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d
1362,1374. These decisions include Tuttle v. Arlington County Sch. Bd. 195 F.3d
698 (4th Cir. 1999), Eisenberg v. Montgomery County Pub. Schs., 197 F.2d 123
(4th Cir. 1999), Wessmann v. Gittens, 160 F.3d 790 (1st Cir. 1998), and Wooden
v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 247 F.3d 1262 (1 1th Cir. 2001).
213. 438 U.S. 265,98 S.Ct. 2733 (1978). Bakke was a mixed opinion in which
"the Justices... agreed to disagree." Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2001) (citing United States v. City of Miami,
614 F.2d 1322, 1337 (5th Cir. 1980) on reh 'g en banc, 664 F.2d 435 (1981)).
214. Johnson, 263 F.3d 1234, 1246 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v.
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 311-12, 98 S.Ct. 2733, 2759 (1978)).
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1251.
217. Id.
218. Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362,
1374 (S.D. Ga., 2000).
219. Id. at 1374-75.
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have concluded that diversity is not a compelling interest? The
Supreme Court has frequently asserted that it will only decide
constitutional questions when it is necessary to the disposition of a
certain case.22 ° This assertion represents a deep rooted tenet of
constitutional adjudication. 2' The Eleventh Circuit chose not to
decide the diversity issue because it could strike down UGA's
admissions policy based on the narrowly tailored analysis. Thus, the
court acted as it should. It avoided passing on a constitutional issue
by deciding Johnson on other grounds.
Even though the Eleventh Circuit followed traditional
constitutional tenet, Johnson reinforced the problems that face courts
and universities when it followed the First and Fourth Circuits's
decisions to leave the diversity issue unanswered. By invoking the
assumption dodge, the Eleventh Circuit joins the ranks of other
"assumers" whose determinations have led affirmative action in
universities to a higher level of dispute. But one court cannot solve
this controversy. Implicit in the "assumers"' decisions is the sound
choice to avoid unnecessary constitutional issues. If a court can
decide a case based on other than constitutional grounds, it will most
likely do so as did the Eleventh Circuit. The decisions of Hopwood,
Smith, and even the Johnson district court are among the minority of
cases that have provided an answer to the diversity issue. Indeed, the
Supreme Court will have the final word. It must provide a resolution.
However, until the Supreme Court decides to put an end to the
diversity issue, other courts will suffer the same fate as the Eleventh
Circuit in Johnson. Johnson stands as a plea to the Supreme Court
for resolution of the diversity issue.
CONCLUSION
The Eleventh Circuit's analysis of the diversity issue in Johnson
maybe right on track. When faced with whether diversity constitutes
a compelling governmental interest that will survive strict scrutiny
review, the court plainly assumes so for its purposes and decides the
case by the narrowly tailored analysis. Consequently, the court
reinforces the chaos that already exists in the area of affirmative
action in higher education. This is particularly troubling because
220. Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 631, 70 S.Ct. 848, 849 (1950).
221. Regents of the Univ. of Calif. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 411, 98 S.Ct. 2733,
2809-10 (1978). Justices Stevens, Burger, Stewart, and Rehnquist stated in their
opinion, "If there is one doctrine more deeply rooted than any other in the process
of constitutional adjudication, it is that we ought not to pass on questions of
constitutionality... unless such adjudication is unavoidable." Bakke, 438 U.S. at
411, 98 S.Ct. at 2809-10 (citing Spector Motor Co. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101,
105, 65 S.Ct. 152, 154 (1944) (footnote omitted)).
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universities and law schools are affected the most. However, the
Eleventh Circuit had no choice. Johnson could be decided without
resorting to constitutional adjudication. Therefore, while providing
no answer, Johnson only contributed to resolution of the diversity
issue by taking its place in line as an "assumer" in what courts and
universities hope is the last call for help to the Supreme Court.
Susannah Gayle Orman*
* The author extends special thanks to Professor Kenneth Murchison for his
guidance and wisdom in advising this note.
[Vol. 63156
